This paper tests the validity of pecking order theory by Myers(1977) and Myers and Majluf(1984) on Korean manufacturing firms listed in the KRX for the years of 1994 to 2003. We also want to see if there is any difference in financing behavior between chaebol affiliated firms and non-chaebol affiliated firms. We develop testable hypotheses from the idea that established relationship between bank and firm mitigates the problem of information asymmetry (Kang and Lim, 2001), and thus makes it easier for firms to raise funds through banks. The test result of the first stage shows that firms prefer cash reserves to debt financing, and prefer debt to equity. Chaebol affiliated firms are found to behave as if they already exploit internal capital markets. The second stage of the test carried out by dividing debt capital into bank loans and corporate bonds also shows a consistent pattern of financing behavior. Firms are testified to prefer cash to bank loans, bank loans to corporate bonds, and corporate bonds to equity. In this case chaebol affiliation seems to make firms behave as if they already establish internal capital markets. Further analysis shows that some, though not in every case, difference of ordering around the occasion of Korean financial crisis exists. It may be from the change of attitude of Korean firms to risk, or from weakened influence of internal capital market along with strengthened market power in the post-crisis period.

Keywords: Pecking Order Theory, Equity, Leverage, Corporate Bonds, Bank Loans, Internal Cash,Chaebol Affiliation, Korean Financial Crisis